2 nature may be. Typically, such theorists tend to view human beings as being plastic with a nature (if one can use that word) that is infinitely, or at least largely, selfrevisable. Francis Fukuyama notes that "for much of this century, the social sciences have been dominated by the assumption that social norms are socially constructed, and that if one wants to explain some particular social fact one must refer…to 'prior social facts' rather than to biology or genetic inheritance. Social scientists do not deny that human beings have physical bodies shaped by nature rather than nurture. But the so-called standard social science model asserts that biology governs only the body; the mind, which is the source of culture, values, and norms, is a completely different matter." 3 On the other side of the argument are those (myself included) who accept the necessity of a theory of human nature for an adequate grounding of ethics and politics though there may be deep divisions among supporters of this basic position as to what kind of theory best fulfils this grounding role. 4 In this paper, I shall claim that an 3 Fukuyama, p. 154. See Frank Michelman, "Legalism and Humankind" in The Good Life and the 3 understanding of the concept of human nature is central to the enterprises of ethics and politics. because it indicates the effective limits of political and ethical debate and that, despite its centrality in ethics and politics (or perhaps because of it) the notion of human nature is essentially contentious. 5 Some accounts of human beings posit them as being through and through plastic.
As Rose, Kamin and Lewontin put it in their book Not in our Genes, which is largely an attempted refutation of the pretensions of sociobiology, "The post-1968 New Left in Britain and the US has shown a tendency to see human nature as almost infinitely plastic, to deny biology and acknowledge only social construction." 6 But could and political creatures with great capabilities for establishing social rules. While the research in a certain sense does not tell us anything that Aristotle didn't know, it allows us to be much more precise about the nature of human sociability, and what is and is not rooted in the human." Fukuyama, p. 138 5 If the concept of nature is notoriously ambiguous, scarcely less ambiguous is the concept of human nature. While conceding the ambiguity of the concepts of 'nature' and 'human nature' Bertie Crowe both denies that the scholastics were unaware of the possible equivocations of the concepts and asserts that "it would seem essential to maintain that there is a 'human nature' which is the standard of natural morality." M. B. Crowe, "Human Nature-Immutable or Mutable, human beings really be 'almost infinitely plastic'? I believe such a position to be both implausible and untenable but I also hold, in agreement with Pinker, 7 that the perceived liberal necessity to hold such a position as a defence against discrimination and injustice is unnecessary.
The search for a single, simple characterisation of human nature appears to be a mistake. Strict definition by genus and differentia would be wonderful if we could get it but it appears to beyond our grasp in regard to human beings. Even in the case of the material world surrounding us, seemingly uncontaminated by the processes of self-reference that bedevil human affairs, it appears that the search for a Theory of Everything is a search without end. Some eight hundred years ago, St Thomas Aquinas wrote in his little work de Ente et Essentia that even in the case of sensible things "the essential differences themselves are not known; whence they are signified through accidental differences, which rise out of the essential ones, as a cause is Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) argues that evolutionary theory fails to explain such distinctive human activities as the human appreciation of the beautiful, the human search for knowledge. For a defence of the (surprising) claim that a full-blooded Darwinian naturalism is compatible with a rejection of standard sociological conception of human nature, see Michael 5 signified through its effect." 8 It is one thing to claim that man has an essence or nature; this is an ontological claim: it is quite another to claim that we can come to know exhaustively what that essence or nature is; this is a matter of epistemology.
Despite ;this difficulty, however, there is nothing obviously idiotic in assessing the qualities and properties of a given species as being more or less essential to that species. We could consider those properties to be more essential that are, in some way, structurally or functionally effective throughout the whole of the animal's activities or at least the greater part of them. In this way, man's rationality is obviously more essential to him than his being two-footed or featherless.
If human nature is properly conceived of as a set of powers, tendencies, or capacities, then the notion of a limit necessarily comes into play for a capacity, if it is to be a capacity, must be a capacity for something relatively determinate. 9 The notion of constraint or limit is an inescapable corollary to the notion of human nature.
Morality is tied to human interests and human properties and these constitute its limit. Finnis's thought between two distinct conceptions of natural law: one, which holds that the principles of natural law are self-evident and underivable, and another, which holds that the principles of natural law are grounded on human nature. Russell Hittinger, on the other hand, places Finnis (together with Germain Grisez) squarely among certain contemporary efforts to recover the core of such a common morality without explicitly relying on a theory of nature.
11 The definitions are from, respectively, Edmund Burke, Charles Lamb, Baruch Spinoza, Benjamin
Franklin, Thomas Carlyle, Sir William Blackstone, and Benjamin Disraeli.
8 necessary (as it will be necessary in the case of those entities whose basic capacities are susceptible of more or less permanent modification) we must move from these modified capacities, which are the proximate source of the entity's activities, to the entity's basic unmodified capacities.
We are here concerned only with human nature as an originative source of ethical and political activity and not with a disquisition on philosophical psychology as such, and so we should begin our inquiry by looking at man's characteristic range of moral activities. 12 Here, however, it seems that we run into immediate difficulties. Different people choose different things, and the same person chooses different things at different times.
Is the field of human action characterised by chaos, or is it possible to discern some principles of order? 13 I do not believe that it is chaotic. I agree with Midgley when she claims that "we know that there have to be some things that are naturally more important, more central to human life, than others, and [we know how to] compare them. We are not really in the helplessly ignorant position philosophical discussions often suggest" 14
Ethical agnosticism is a delicate plant that, like scepticism in general, can survive only in the hothouse atmosphere of the academy; ethical agnostics can remain agnostic only so long as they are willing to deny the validity of their own experience.
Is there anyone who, having worked for some time in the expectation of being 12 It could be argued that all intentional human action is ipso facto moral. are very various and it seems unreasonable to hope that a satisfactory account of the good for man should arbitrarily select one of these co-ordinate goods as being the good above and independent of all the others. Midgley, once again, puts the matter clearly: "We want incompatible things, and want them badly. We are fairly
aggressive, yet we want company and depend on long-term enterprises. We love those around us and need their love, yet we want independence and need to wander.
We are restlessly curious and meddling, yet long for permanence. Unlike many primates, we do have a tendency to pair-formation, but it is an incomplete one….In dealing with such conflicts we have no option but to reason from the facts about our human wants and needs." 15
The picture that emerges is one in which the objects of human action and the human actions directed towards them are at once manifold and varied, and yet ordered, or at least capable of being ordered. If the objects of human action are so orderable, so too should the human actions directed towards them be orderable. There are many particular goods that can be chosen by us and yet it is important to us-that is, it is 14 Midgley, Beast and Man, p. 261.
15 Midgley, Beast and Man, p. 190. itself another good-that the selection of particular goods should be such that they do not clash with one another and cancel one another out. The good is sought in every limited and particular good and yet no particularised good can exhaustively express or contain it. There are always more and other goods necessarily excluded by our particular choices.
A tension can arise between the egalitarian position that goods are more or less Those ineluctably given aspects of our being that moderns call instincts or drives St Thomas calls 'inclinations.' 16 He believes that there is an order of natural inclinations which can be quite generally categorised and that these inclinations are indicative of the range of objects and activities which will present themselves to us as goods, for good has the nature of an end, and so, all things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as good, and so as worthy of pursuit. 17 The first natural inclination to the good in based on that which is entirely common to all substances, and this is the inclination that each substance has to preserve itself in its own proper being according to its own nature. would always have to be observed; but since it happens sometimes that man's will is unrighteous there are cases in which a deposit should not be restored, lest a man of unrighteous will make evil use of the thing deposited; as when a madman or an enemy of the common weal demands the return of his weapons." 22 20 "We are used to hearing in the context of the natural law, that man as a substance has an inclination to survival; as an animal he has an instinct towards the procreative union of male and female; and, as rational, he has an urge to communicate with others, to co-operate with them in society and to increase his knowledge and develop his talents. Have we here those elements in human nature which persist through the greatest variations in civilizations and culture and provide the principles that can be applied to the infinite complexity of circumstances in which man finds himself?" Crowe, "Natural Law Theory Today," p. 362. 25 Crowe notes that while "moral principles may be invariable…their application is conditioned by circumstances-and circumstances do alter cases." "Natural Law Theory Today," p. 378.
26 Crowe, "Natural Law Theory Today," p. 373.
necessity to exemplify it if they are to be meaningful, so too the first principle of practical reason necessarily informs all human action.
How does a theory of human nature operate in ethics and politics? Can we set out a theory and deduce particular consequence from it as if it were a set of axioms and the consequences were its theorems? The answer must be-assuredly not! 27 To begin 27 "When Aquinas speaks of principles in the theoretic order he does so with considerable ambiguity.
At times he speaks as if such principles were the premises in a piece of reasoning. But at other times his first principles are such as the principle of contradiction, of excluded middle, etc. Now from such principles it is impossible to derive any argument. The truth is that by first principles he may mean the fundamental axioms in any given field of enquiry. But at other times he means principles immanent to the whole process of reasoning-not premises in an argument, but the structure without which no argument would be coherent-not axioms but rules of thought." Columba Ryan, "The Traditional Concept of Natural Law," in Light on the Natural Law, ed. Illtud Evans (London: Burns and Oates, 1965), p. 26. Hittinger too notes that "The strongest suit of traditional natural-law theory is not necessarily its capacity to generate a list of precepts, which are then used to generate tables of positive laws. Such lists and tables can be, and indeed have been, done on the basis of something other than explicit natural-law theory. The long tradition of scholastic natural law has recognized that particular rules are ordinarily derived in a rather remote way from basic natural-law precepts, and that moral deliberation is usually governed by a complex network of traditions; civil, ecclesiastical, cultural. It is a mistake to expect natural law theory to constitute an over-arching table of laws which can be straightforwardly applied to issues ranging from the use of condoms to the allocation of public monies.
One can agree with Pincoffs that the test of a moral theory cannot simply be its facility in resolving an indefinite array of quandaries. For a moral outlook should, at the outset, be able to delimit the range of such issues, and the principle of delimitation is not only the perspective implicit in the individual agent's character, but also the philosophical view of what the world is like and how it is ordered. Natural law theory is best able to treat the more identifiably philosophical problem of whether human reason is related to an order that is not merely of its own making and doing." Hittinger, "After Once a nature has been more or less clearly delineated, once we have some reasonable grasp of the characteristic human needs, desires, and inclinations arranged more or less coherently in an account of human nature, then this knowledge can be used as an organising explanatory principle in relation to a range of data wider than that from which it was originally elicited. If the concept of human nature is not to be sterile then it must be applicable in such a way. Of course a theory of human nature is cater for the moral doubts and dilemmas of our or any age….The genuine natural law….is quite sufficiently flexible and nuanced a notion to accommodate the modern difficulties." "Natural Law always open to modification in the light of reflective experience, though not every part of the account will be equally revisable, and it may be difficult to imagine what could count as evidence against the central elements of the theory.
In practice, a theory of human nature functions in ethics and politics by articulating the limits within which questions may sensibly be asked and answered, and, in the case of particular naturalistic theories by attempting to pre-empt any possible rival non-naturalistic theories by interpreting their positions as being partial, inadequate, or limiting cases of itself.
